Understanding the Federal Fiscal Mismatch Architecture in India

#GS-2 #Indian Polity & Constitution #Federalism #GS-3 #Economy #Taxation #Budget #Fiscal Federalism #State Development Loans

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Economist **Jayan Jose Thomas** analyzed the growing debt of Indian states, showing that high debt comes from a structural gap between state responsibilities and revenue powers rather than poor management.
In India's fiscal system, the **Union government** collects major taxes, while **States** handle key public spends like health, education, agriculture, and welfare.
Since state spending usually exceeds their earnings, states must rely heavily on **market borrowings** to fill the funding deficit.

In **2023-24**, Kerala generated local taxes **1.5 times the national average**, yet its share in Union tax devolution was capped at **1.92%**, despite having **2.6%** of India's population.
High fixed operational costs force Kerala to spend **90%** of its financial resources on daily expenses, leaving just **10%** for **capital expenditure**.
Fixed costs dominate the budget, with **20%** going to government salaries, **15.3%** to pensions, and **16.5%** to interest payments on market debts.
Kerala's banks have a low **Credit-to-Deposit (CD) ratio** of **66%**, which is below the national average of **76%** and far behind commercial hubs like **Maharashtra** and **Tamil Nadu** that cross **100%**.
States pay high interest rates between **6.5% and 7.5%** on **State Development Loans (SDLs)**, which is **0.25 to 0.75 percentage points** higher than what the Union government pays.

Limited state funds prevent the creation of top universities, research centers, and public transport, leading to a severe brain drain of educated youth.
States cannot cut daily operational spending quickly because doing so would immediately harm their progress in public health and literacy rates.
A sharp rise in private wealth alongside poor government revenues creates a troubling contrast that widens regional socioeconomic inequality.
High interest payments on **State Development Loans (SDLs)** trap states in a cycle where new loans pay off old debts instead of building productive assets.
By comparison, local authorities in China access bank funds at a low subsidized rate of **around 2%**, avoiding the heavy market penalties that Indian states face.

In China, local governments execute most major infrastructure projects by accessing public savings from domestic banks through central planning.
Chinese local entities issue competitive **Local Government Bonds (LGBs)** directly to raise funds from investors.
Local authorities generate substantial funding by selling commercial land rights on a large scale.
Sub-national governments use specialized units called **Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs)** to secure off-budget loans.

India should reform its tax distribution rules to reward states that excel at raising their own local revenues.
Financial rules must change to help states borrow unutilized local bank savings directly for building public assets.
The **Union government** should offer credit guarantees for state borrowings to remove the **0.25 to 0.75 percentage point** penalty on **State Development Loans (SDLs)**.
States need a **10-year** plan to push capital spending well above the **10%** limit to fund public transport and tech parks.
Interstate agreements must ensure that healthcare, pensions, and welfare benefits move seamlessly with migrant workers across state lines.

Borrowing to build universities, hospitals, and agricultural systems creates long-term value that strict spending cuts can never achieve.
Fixing high interest rates on **State Development Loans (SDLs)** and utilizing local bank savings will secure social progress and spur economic growth across states.